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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over
interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a first degree or capital felony.

Utah

Code §78-2a-3 (2) (e) . Mr. Robertson's petition for interlocutory
review was granted by this Court on December 22, 1993.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issue before the court is whether §10-3-928 of the Utah
Code, which expressly allows city attorneys to prosecute state
infractions and misdemeanors in the name of the State of Utah
violates Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution?
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss based upon its
conclusion that the challenged statute is constitutionally valid
1

presents a question of law.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals

reviews that decision under a correction-of-error standard,
granting no particular deference to the trial court.

West Valley

City v. Streeter, 208 Utah Adv. Rep 92, (Utah App. 1993) .
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Article VIII, Section 16, of the Utah Constitution provides:
The Legislature shall provide for a system of public
prosecutors who shall have primary responsibility for
the prosecution of criminal actions brought in the name
of the State of Utah and shall perform such other
duties as may be provided by statute. Public
prosecutors shall be elected in a manner provided by
statute, and shall be admitted to practice law in Utah.
The original action against Mr. Robertson was brought
pursuant to the authority provided to the prosecutor under Utah
Code §10-3-928 which states:
In cities with a city attorney, the city attorney may
prosecute violations of city ordinances, and under
state law, infractions and misdemeanors occurring
within the boundaries of the municipality and has the
same powers in respect to the violations as are
exercised by a county attorney, including, but not
limited to, granting immunity to witnesses. The city
attorney shall represent the interests of the state or
the municipality in the appeal of any matter prosecuted
in any trial court by the city attorney.
The Legislature added a technical amendment to §10-3-928 in
1993 to include district attorneys, however, the operative
language allowing city attorneys the authority to prosecute state
infractions and misdemeanors has remained the same.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
Defendant, Bruce S. Robertson, petitioned for interlocutory

appeal from the ruling of the Third Circuit Court, State of Utah,
2

denying Robertson's motion to dismiss an Information filed
against him based upon the alleged unconstitutionality of Utah
Code §10-3-928.

In denying Robertson's motion to dismiss the

trial court upheld the constitutionality of Utah Code §10-3-928,
which grants authority to cities with city attorney's to
prosecute state infractions and misdemeanors.
II.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
West Jordan City brought four charges against Bruce S.

Robertson in the Third Circuit Court, West Valley Department,
which are:

(1) Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol in

violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44; (2) Driving on Revocation
in violation of Section 41-2-136.3; (3) Reckless Driving in
violation of Section 41-6-45; and (4) Fleeing from a Police
Officer in violation of Section 41-6-13.5.
Robertson was arraigned and Susan Denhardt, Legal Defenders
Association, was appointed to represent him.

Robertson filed a

motion to dismiss claiming that the city attorney did not have
the authority to prosecute state code charges.

The trial court

denied Robertson's motion to dismiss finding that the defense had
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Utah Code §10-3928 is unconstitutional and holding that §10-3-928 does fit
within the framework of the Utah Constitution.

This Court

granted Robertson's petition for interlocutory review upon the
trial court's denial of Robertson's motion to dismiss.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution directs
3

the Utah Legislature to establish a system of public prosecutors
who have primary responsibility for the prosecution of criminal
actions bought in the name of the State of Utah.

By the use of

the word primary the constitutional language mandates that there
are other prosecutors who also have responsibility to prosecute
actions in the name of the State of Utah.

City attorneys have

been fulfilling this role for almost twenty years.

By enacting

Utah Code §10-3-928 the Legislature slightly expanded the role of
city attorneys in the prosecution arena and established public
policy by further defining the prosecution system as the
Legislature is directed to do pursuant to the constitutional
language.
ARGUMENT
PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION
A basic principle of constitutional adjudication is that the
courts should presume statutes to be constitutionally valid.
Utah Associated Municipal Power System v. Public Service
Commission, 789 P.2d 298 (Utah 1990).

Also, it is a fundamental

principle of judicial review that where possible, the court
refrain from deciding constitutional questions, unless required
to do so.

State by and through Division of Consumer Protection

v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd, 786 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1990).
The party attacking the constitutionality of the statute has
the burden of proof in establishing the statutes
unconstitutionality.

Utah Associated Municipal Power System v.

Public Service Commission, 789 P.2d 298 (Utah 1990).
4

Utah courts

have made it abundantly clear that the reviewing court, when
faced with a "constitutional" question, has "a duty" to construe
the statute to avoid constitutional infirmities whenever
possible.

Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company v.

Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184 (Utah 1991).

A statute will not be

held to be unconstitutional if any reasonable basis can be found
to bring it within constitutional framework.
P.2d 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

State v. Davis, 787

If there are two alternative

statutory constructions available

one rendering the statute

constitutional and the other unconstitutional

the former

construction should be adopted. Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph Company v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989).

The court

will not invalidate the statute unless it is "clearly in
conflict" with the Constitution.
(Utah 1983) .

State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220

The court is to afford the challenged statute every

presumption of validity, so long as there is a reasonable basis
upon which both provisions of the statute and the mandate of the
Constitution may be reconciled.

Timpanogos Planning and Water

Management Agency v. Central Utah Water Conservancy District, 690
P.2d 562 (Utah 1984).
Past court decisions have framed the standard of proof
required before a statute may be declared to be unconstitutional
as "clearly and palpably" unconstitutional.

See Ellis v.

Department of Social Services of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980).

Recently the Utah

Court of Appeals has declared that a statute will not be struck
5

down unless it appears to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt."

State v. Davis, 787 P.2d 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

In

clarifying and restating the burden to be met by one who
challenges a statute on constitutional grounds the Utah Supreme
Court stated that "The act is presumed valid, and we resolve any
reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality".

Society of

Separationists v. Whitehead 227 Utah Adv. Rep 67 (Utah App. 1993)
When applied against the foregoing jurisprudential principles,
defendant's arguments fail.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INFORMAL OPINION 92-16
Robertson, relying almost exclusively on Informal Opinion
#92-16, dated 4 December 1992, issued by the Attorney General's
Office, has moved to have the charges filed against him
dismissed.

A signed copy of Informal Opinion #92-16 is contained

in Addendum A.

Informal Opinion 92-16 concluded that Utah Code

§10-3-928, was unconstitutional.

In reaching the conclusion that

Utah Code §10-3-928 is unconstitutional the Attorney General's
Opinion does not even refer to a single Utah appellate court
decision concerning the "constitutionality" of an act.

Rather,

the opinion concludes that all prosecutions in the name of the
State of Utah must either be by an elected prosecutor or by a
prosecutor under the direction and supervision of an elected
prosecutor.
The Attorney General's Opinion ignores the constitutional
language of Article VIII, Section 16 that mandates to the
Legislature to establish a system of public prosecutors who have
6

primary responsibility for the prosecution of criminal actions
brought in the name of the State of Utah.

The opinion focuses

entirely upon court decisions from other jurisdictions without
recognizing or acknowledging that city attorneys have had
statutory authority to prosecute in the name of the State of Utah
for nearly twenty years.

Such selective, result-oriented

jurisprudence is inappropriate in this setting, particularly when
the constitutionality of a statute is at issue.
This case is distinguishable from the cases cited in the
Informal Opinion and Robertson's brief.

Defendant cited Murphy

v. Yates, 348 A.2d 837, 841 (Md. Ct. App. 1975), a Maryland case,
which decided whether a prosecutor created by state law could
prosecute when those same duties were given to the State's
Attorneys.

However, the Maryland Constitution was worded

differently, and the history of the Attorney General and State's
Attorneys were much different than that of Utah's prosecutors.
The Maryland State's Attorneys derived their powers through
constitutional revision from those granted earlier to the
Attorney General:

"It shall be the duty of the attorney general

to prosecute and defend . . ., all cases now depending, . . . ."
Murphy v. Yates, 348 A.2d 837, 841 (Md. Ct. App. 1975) (declaring
a legislative act unconstitutional which created an independent
state prosecutor's office having some of the same duties as the
State's Attorney).
However, Judge Levine, in dissent, focused on the
constitutional language granting the State's Attorney power
7

("as

shall be provided by law") and said that the majority was wrong
because an overwhelming number of jurisdictions having such
language permitted the legislature to fully prescribe such duties
including diminishing them.

Further, that the act was not

unconstitutional because it did not cause the office of State's
Attorney to be left without its "substantial duties,
responsibilities and rights."
Additionally, Robertson, and the Attorney General's Opinion
cited a Rhode Island case which considered whether proposed
legislation would create a conflict with the constitutional
powers of the Attorney General.

The court held that providing a

special prosecutor with "full prosecutorial authority" would be a
transfer of the Attorney General's "fundamental powers."
However, that court based its decision largely on the following:
"It is well settled in this state that the Attorney General is
the only state official vested with prosecutorial discretion."
In re House of Representatives, 575 A.2d 176, 179 (R.I. 1990)
(holding that proposed legislation violated a constitutional
provision concerning the Attorney General's duties and powers).
Lastly, Robertson, and the Attorney General's Opinion cited
a North Dakota case which considered whether the enforcement of
liquor laws could be performed by an appointed office.

That

court said that to interpret the constitution it must be
considered in the "light of contemporaneous history - of
conditions existing at and prior to its adoption."
Corliss, 114 N.W. 962, 967 (N.D. 1907).
8

Ex parte

The ultimate decision of

the North Dakota court was that an office created by the
constitution could not be eroded in its power by an appointed
office.

However, the court made it clear that the history and

the intent of the framers were important considerations.

"In

other words, the spirit as well as the letter of the instrument,
must be given effect."

Id. at 967.

Concerning the application of constitutional cases from
other states, Justice Oaks of the Utah Supreme Court has
observed:
It makes clear that the question posed here turns on a
construction of disparate provision of the
constitutions and statutes of the various states. In
this area, judicial opinions from other states have
limited value as precedents, except insofar as they
identify the public policy consideration that
illuminate constitutional and statutory construction.
Wilson v Manning, 657 P.2d 251 at 252 (Utah 1982).
Unlike the cases cited by Robertson, Utah's Legislature is
directed to provide for a system of public prosecutors who have
primary responsibility for the criminal actions brought in the
name of the state of Utah.

When the new language of the Utah

Constitution was adopted the Legislature was fully aware that
city attorneys have historically had prosecutorial authority
which they shared with elected prosecutors.

Utah's Constitution

does not grant exclusive authority to elected prosecutors, nor
deprive the Legislature of their power to establish the state's
prosecutorial system.
ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 16 CONTEMPLATES
ELECTED AND NON-ELECTED PROSECUTORS
The defendant, in arguing that the clear language of Utah
9

Code §10-3-928 is unconstitutional, focuses merely upon the word
"elected" in Article VIII, Section 16, of the Utah Constitution
and refuses to consider the language of the entire section.

The

defendant argues that having an elected prosecutor maintains the
integrity of the prosecutorial role and implies that an appointed
prosecutor may be susceptible to outside pressures.

The court

should note that in the federal district attorney's office, the
largest single prosecutorial system, federal district attorney's
are appointed, not elected.

Contrary to the underlying theme of

defendant's argument, public policy does not dictate that all
prosecutors be elected.
Article VIII, Section 16, of the Utah Constitution provides:
The Legislature shall provide for a system of public
prosecutors who shall have primary responsibility for
the prosecution of criminal actions brought in the name
of the State of Utah and shall perform such other
duties as may be provided by statute. Public
prosecutors shall be elected in a manner provided by
statute, and shall be admitted to practice law in
Utah.
The language of Article VIII, Section 16, states that public
prosecutors shall have the primary responsibility for the
prosecution of criminal actions brought in the name of the State
of Utah.

Without considering the distinction between what is the

primary responsibility and what would be the secondary
responsibility, or nonprimary responsibility, defendant relies
upon the Attorney General's Informal Opinion and asserts that a
problem arises because city attorneys are not under the
supervision or control of elected public prosecutors.

Defendant

ignores the clear language of Article VIII, Section 16 and argues
10

that all prosecutions must be under the direction of an elected
prosecutor.

Defendant fails to address the idea that the

Legislature provided for a system of prosecution that did not
require all prosecutors to be under the control or supervision of
the Attorney General, or an elected county or district attorney.
Title 77, Chapter 10(a) of the Utah Code, Grand Jury Reform,
allows for a district court judge serving as the supervising
judge on the five-judge grand jury panel to appointment a special
prosecutor if the supervising judge follows certain criteria.
The special prosecutor is neither elected, nor supervised by
elected prosecutors.

Plaintiff recognizes there is a distinction

between a special prosecutor and a city attorney.

However, the

illustration points out that the absolute strict construction
defendant argues for in having all prosecutors elected or
supervised by an elected prosecutor would make several provisions
of the Utah Code unconstitutional.
In deciding whether Utah Code §10-3-928 is unconstitutional
the court must determine who functions in the role of a public
prosecutor.

Then, secondly, if the public prosecutor does not

have complete responsibility, then what other prosecutors, if not
public prosecutors, have responsibility to prosecute criminal
actions brought in the name of the State of Utah?
Article VIII, Section 16, begins with the phrase stating
that "the legislature shall provide for a system of public
prosecutors who shall have the primary responsibility for the
prosecution of criminal actions . . . ."
11

First, "the legislature

shall provide . . . ." clearly indicates that the framers did not
intend for the Constitution to mandate this system, but rather
that the Legislature should create this system by statute.
Second, that these prosecutors shall have "primary
responsibility" indicates that the framers envisioned a secondary
prosecuting responsibility.
The Legislature has "provided for" the "system" by
designating that county attorneys or district attorneys of the
various counties or districts, respectively, to be the public
prosecutorial agency with the primary responsibility to prosecute
state cases.
nature.

However, that designation is not absolute in

The legislatively adopted system provides for the

"sharing" of this prosecutorial responsibility.

Indeed, §17-18-

1(1)(a), Utah Code, provides:
(1) In each county which is not within a
prosecution district, the county attorney is
a public prosecutor and shall:
(a) conduct on behalf of the state
all prosecutions for public
offenses committed within the
county, except for prosecutions
undertaken by the city attorney
under Section 10-3-928 and appeals
from them; . . . .
(2)

The county attorney:

(a) shall appear and prosecute for
the state in the district court of
the county in all criminal
prosecutions; . . .
Also, §17-18-1.7(1) (a) and (2) (a) Utah Code, follows the
same language in describing the powers and duties of the district
attorneys.
12

(1) The district attorney is a public
prosecutor and shall:
(a) prosecute in the name of the
state all violations of criminal
statutes of the state;. .
(c) conduct on behalf of the state
all prosecutions for public
offenses committed within the
county, except for prosecutions
undertaken by the city attorney
under Section 10-3-928 and appeals
from them; . . . .
(2)

The district attorney shall:
(a) appear and prosecute for the
state in the district court all
criminal actions for violation of
state law;. . .

If the position of Robertson, and the Attorney General's
Opinion, is to be followed, portions of these statutes would be
unconstitutional.
are §76-10-1215

Other potentially "unconstitutional" statutes

(adopted in 1977, authorizing city attorneys to

prosecute state law obscenity violations, including felonies),
§41-6-44.8

(originally adopted in 1983, authorizing city

attorneys to prosecute traffic code violations, including
enhanced DUI, driving on revocation and/or suspension, and
automobile homicide) and §76-10-1308

(authorizing city attorneys

to prosecute prostitution violations).

If the court accepts the

interpretation the defendant argues for several separate statutes
could be "unconstitutional."
In lieu of such a drastic result, could there not be another
interpretation of Article VIII, Section 16 which would give
validity to all of the statutes

of which two actually preceded

13

the adoption, in 1984, of the constitutional amendment? We submit
that such an interpretation is found within the text of Article
VIII, Section 16 itself.

The Section specifies that "(t)he

Legislature shall provide for a system of public prosecutors . .
. ."

Indeed, the Legislature has complied with that obligation:

It has established a "system", wherein the county and district
attorneys have "primary responsibility11 for conducting the
criminal prosecutions.

However, if the county attorney or

district attorney has "primary responsibility" to conduct the
criminal prosecutions, could it not be that there must be another
prosecutor which might have "secondary responsibility" for those
prosecutions?

That prosecutor is

the

city attorney.

Defendant argues that primary responsibility means chief or
principal control or authority over the prosecution.
defendant again circumvents the word primary.

However,

Who did the

Legislature have in mind when they used the word primary rather
than sole or exclusive responsibility?
to give non-primary responsibility to

The Legislature intended
certain prosecutors to

prosecute actions in the name of the State of Utah.

City

attorneys are the prosecutors the Legislature intended to fulfill
that secondary role.
The "system" devised by the Legislature is similar, in
certain aspects, to "federalism:"

The prosecutorial power is

divided between two prosecutorial agencies.

This approach is

consistent with the "primary responsibility" language and allows
for an interpretation which gives meaning to the term "primary".
14

Robertson's interpretation of that phrase substitutes a new word
(i.e. "sole" or "exclusive" responsibility) in the phrase.

Such

an interpretation does violence to the whole purpose of the 1984
constitutional amendment.

That amendment was not intended to

render "unconstitutional" those statutes

such as §41-6-44.8

(adopted 1983) and §76-10-1215 (adopted 1977)

which were

already in effect and which then allowed municipal attorneys to
handle state prosecutions.
Similarly, the 1984 constitutional amendment is not offended
by §10-3-928, §17-18-1(a) (1) or §17-18-1.7 (1) (a) . Therefore,
Utah Code Ann. §10-3-928 does not violate Article VIII, Section
16 of the Utah Constitution.
Robertson has failed in his burden to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the statute, presumed to be constitutional,
is "unconstitutional."

Robertson focuses merely upon the word

"elected" as though it were the most important word, to dominate
the entire provision.

With regard to the "elected" issue,

Robertson's argument is merely a smokescreen, not focusing upon
the correct issue.
The 1984 constitutional amendment was proposed to the
electorate with the endorsement of the Legislature and various
prosecuting agencies, including but not limited to the Utah
Association of Counties, the Statewide Association of Prosecutors
(SWAP) and the Attorney General. The requirement that there be an
"elected" prosecutor was very important, for the following
reason:

The "primary" prosecutor had to be elected in order to
15

insure that there was an independent prosecutor who could
zealously undertake that prosecution without fear of being fired
if he prosecuted the wrong person, such as another government
official, whether elected or appointed.
The provision requiring that public prosecutors be elected
does not require that ALL prosecutors be elected.

The

Legislature has "provided" the "system" of "public prosecutors,"
in which the "elected" county or district attorney and/or the
appointed city attorney, under the provisions of §10-3-928, could
prosecute state statute violations.

If at any time a city

attorney fails to prosecute an individual for an alleged
violation then the appropriate county or district attorney can
prosecute the alleged violations.

However, city attorneys can

not prosecute all violations of state law, only misdemeanors and
infractions.

This distinction delineates between public

prosecutors with primary responsibility and city attorneys who
have a secondary responsibility and are only allowed to prosecute
infractions and misdemeanors.
If the public feels a city attorney is failing to prosecute
certain violations of the law then the public can request that
the county or district attorney prosecute the violations.

This

is the safe guard the public has against city attorneys not
fulfilling their prosecutorial responsibilities.

However, if a

county or district attorney fails or refuses to prosecute certain
violations then the public must elect a different county or
district attorney.
16

Defendants arguments and those arguments put forth by the
Attorney General's Opinion 92-16 are not concerned that the city
attorneys will fail to prosecute violations of the law.

Rather,

the arguments seem to focus on the fact that city attorneys will
not be supervised by the Attorney General or county attorney.
Perhaps this is exactly what the Legislature intended when they
amended §10-3-928 giving municipal attorneys autonomy from state
and county government.
The Legislature saw the need to authorize municipal
attorneys to prosecute state misdemeanors and infractions.

The

specific purpose of the Legislature's intent behind the 1991
amendment of §10-3-928 is found in the title to House Bill 436
[Trial Court Organization and Jurisdiction]:
increasing authority of city prosecutors. . ."

"An Act . . .
Emphasis added.

Therefore, we request this court to uphold the trial court's
denial of Robertson's motion to dismiss and find that Utah Code
§10-3-928 is constitutional.
CONCLUSION
Robertson's argument requires that this court accept his
interpretation of the wording of Article VIII, Section 16;
however, the weight of evidence is clearly in favor of the State.
Historically, the communities of Utah have been represented by
both appointed and elected prosecutors.

It has been the

Legislatures intent in passing several statutes, including §10-3928, allowing city attorneys to prosecute actions in the name of
the state, to have both appointed as well as elected prosecutors
17

to be part of Utah's system of prosecutors.
Robertson has not met his burden of establishing, by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statutes, specifically §10-3928, authorizing the municipal attorney-directed prosecution of
the alleged state statute violations are unconstitutional.

On

the contrary, there is at least one other reasonable
interpretation to Article VIII, Section 16 which gives meaning
and significance to the entire provision.

This Court should rule

that Robertson has not met his burden of persuasion.
should follow its principles of constitutional

The Court

adjudication

regarding the presumption of validity and declare that §10-3-928,
is constitutional and that the instant prosecution may proceed.
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of July, 1994.
WES/ri/ JDRD,

CtTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

GRECy Jjf CURTIS
Assj/sttfant West J o r d a n C i t y A t t o r n e y
Att|>r$ey f o r P l a i n t i f f
S t a t e of U t a h
8000 South Redwood Road
West Jordan, Utah 84 088
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ADDENDUM A

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

STATE OF UTAN
JOHNfcCLARK

JAN GRAHAM

JOSEPH F TESCH

Counsel to the Attorney General
Department of State Counsel

Solicitor General
Department of Appeals & Opinions

Chief Deputy Attorney General
Department of Public Advocacy

December 4, 1992
Mr. David E. Yocom
Salt Lake County Attorney
2001 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Subject:

Informal Opinion No* 92-16
H,B. 436 - Authority of City Attorneys
To Prosecute Under State Law

Dear Mr* Yocom:
On behalf of the Advisory Board of the Statewide Association
of Prosecutors, you have asked our opinion concerning the
constitutionality of a portion of House Bill 436 (1991 General
Session) which amended Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 and which
statutorily authorized city attorneys to prosecute violations of
certain state laws occurring within the boundaries of their
municipalities.
Noting that city attorneys are not elected, you asked whether
this provision, violates Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah
Constitution which provides that public prosecutors shall be
elected and shall have primary responsibility for the prosecution
of criminal actions brought in the name of the State of Utah. You
indicated that before the passage of H.B, 436, city attorneys had
been limited in their prosecution duties to prosecuting under city
ordinances or specific state statutes as provided by the
legislature, or under authority granted to them by deputization
from county attorneys.
Issues and Short Answers
PRIMARY ISSUE: Is the provision in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928
which authorizes city attorneys to prosecute crimes under state law
constitutional?
SHORT ANSWER: No.
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SECONDARY ISSUE: Are convictions which have been obtained by
city prosecutors pursuant to section 10-3-928 nevertheless valid?
SHORT ANSWER:

Yes.
Analysis

As amended, Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 reads:
Attorney duties -- Deputy public prosecutor
In cities with a city attorney, the city
attorney may prosecute violations of city
ordinances, and under state law, infractions
and
misdemeanors
occurring
within
the
boundaries of the municipality and has the
same powers in respect to the violations as
are exercised by a county attorney, including,
but not limited to, granting immunity to
witnesses . . Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution provides as
follows:
The Legislature shall provide for a system of

public prosecutors who shall have
primary
responsibility
for the prosecution of criminal
actions brought in the name of the State of
Utah and shall perform such other duties as
may be provided by
statutePublic

prosecutors

shall

be

elected

in a manner

provided by statute, and shall be admitted to
practice law in Utah... [emphasis added.]
The Constitution thus provides that public prosecutors shall
have primary responsibility for the prosecution of state criminal
actions, and that such prosecutors must be elected.
The
legislature has provided for such a system of elected public
prosecutors by establishing county attorneys, who are elected, and
by vesting prosecutorial
authority in the Attorney General, who is
also elected.1

!

Utah Code Ann. § 67-5-1(5) vests the Attorney General with
supervisory powers over county attorneys of the state in all
matters pertaining to the duties of their offices. There is no
such provision giving the Attorney General supervisory authority
over city attorneys.
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Also, a deputy county attorney may act for the county
attorney, without violating the constitutional provision that
elected public prosecutors have primary responsibility, as a county
attorney can always review a deputy's recommendation and substitute
the county attorney's own decision for that of the deputy. State
v. Winne, 189 N.W. 119, 120 (S.D. 1922) (wa deputy state's attorney
does not fill a new office created by statute, and is not endowed
with functions usurped from those of the constitutional officer.")
The problem with section 10-3-928 is that it gives broad
general authority to city attorneys who are appointed rather than
elected (Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-902) to exercise the powers of
public prosecutors by prosecuting infractions and misdemeanors
under state law; that is, prosecuting in the name of the State of
Utah. Thus, under section 10-3-928, a city attorney derives the
power to prosecute state offenses directly from the statute, rather
than by being a delegee of, and under the supervision of, a public
prosecutor.
Indeed, the statute grants prosecutorial authority to a city
attorney whether or not the county attorney consents. The city
attorney could decide to prosecute a person whom the county
attorney would not have prosecuted, or to grant immunity to one to
whom the county attorney would not have granted immunity, or to
prosecute as a misdemeanor a case that the county attorney would
have prosecuted as a felony. These types of decisions are the
essence of prosecutorial discretion. &g£ 27 CJ.S. District and
Prosecuting Attorneys § 14(1). State v. Bell> 785 P.2d 390, 402
(Utah 1989) (prosecutors are given broad discretion in determining
whether and in what manner to prosecute a case). Further, since
county attorneys are elected, the people have the authority to vote
the public prosecutor out of office should they be dissatisfied
with the decisions of the prosecutor.
In Ex Parte Corliss, 114 N.W. 962 (N.D. 1907), a state statute
created an appointed office of "enforcement commissioner'1 and
invested the commissioner with all of the common-law and statutory
powers of elected state's attorneys in the enforcement of state
liquor laws* The court found the statute unconstitutional, stating
that it "violates those provisions of our state Constitution by
which the people reserved the right to have the public functions
which are attempted to be conferred upon the officers created by
said act discharged by officers of their own selection." !£. at
963. The court also stated that "if these constitutional offices
can be stripped of a portion of the inherent functions thereof,
they can be stripped of all such functions, and the same can be
vested in newly created appointive officers, and the will of the
framers of the Constitution thereby thwarted." !£. at 964.
Numerous jurisdictions have followed the Corliss court's
rationale. For instance, in Murphy v, Yates. 348 A.2d 837 (Md.
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App. 1975) , the court: struck down a statute which created the
office of state prosecutor as an independent unit in the executive
branch because it constituted an invasion of the powers and duties
of the state's attorneys and the Attorney General, in violation of
the Maryland'Constitution.
The Maryland court enunciated the principle that "if an office
is created in the Constitution, and specific powers are granted or
duties imposed by the Constitution, . • . the position can neither
be abolished by statute nor reduced to impotence by the transfer of
duties characteristic of the office to another office created by
the legislature• [citations omitted] We regard this as but another
facet of the principle of separation of powers, guaranteed by [the
Maryland Constitution]. 1^. at 846.
The court went on to state:
We do not find persuasive the contention that
the duties imposed on the Special Prosecutor
are concurrent with the powers of the State's
Attorneys.
The simple fact is that the
Special Prosecutor's power to initiate an
investigation and to commence prosecution is a
State's Attorney's most awesome discretionary
power:
to determine whether or not to
prosecute. . . . Praiseworthy through the
purpose of the General Assembly might have
been in enacting the legislation, the result
can
only
be
validly
achieved
by
a
constitutional amendment,
I&. at 848.
Similarly, in the case of ;Tn re House of Representatives. 57S
A.2d 176 (R.I. 1990), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island determined
that proposed legislation* which would have created a procedure for
appointing
a special prosecutor to investigate and prosecute
certain crimes, violated that state's constitution by severely
infringing upon the fundamental constitutional powers of the
elected Attorney General. !£• at 179-180.
We find the authorities outlined above to be persuasive and
well-reasoned. Any person who prosecutes in the name of the State
of Utah must, according to the Utah Constitution, either be elected
or be responsible to a public prosecutor who is elected (that is,
responsible to one who has "primary responsibilityw for the
prosecution of criminal actions brought in the name of the State of
Utah)•
A city attorney prosecuting state criminal actions by
virtue of section 10-3-928 is neither an elected prosecutor nor
responsible to an elected prosecutor* Indeed, each prosecutorial
decision made by the non-elected city prosecutor diminishes the
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authority of the elected county attorney to decide otherwise.
Consequently, section 10-3-928, which purports to create the power
to prosecute under state law in a person who is neither elected nor
responsible to an elected prosecutor, violates the Utah
Constitution:
While city attorneys cannot derive power to prosecute in the
name of the State of Utah directly from statute, county attorneys
are empowered to deputize city attorneys to conduct such
prosecutions. For example, Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-111(2) provides
that a county attorney "may appoint city prosecutors as deputies to
prosecute state offenses in municipal justice courts." Therefore,
if a county attorney deputizes a city attorney, then the city
attorney derives the power to prosecute state offenses from the
county attorney, and is subordinate to and responsible to the
county attorney, an elected prosecutor.
Effect Upon Prior Convictions
The foregoing opinion raises the issue of what effect, if any,
the opinion may have upon prior convictions obtained by city
attorneys acting pursuant to section 10-3-928. We believe that any
determination that section 10-3-928 is unconstitutional would not
void any otherwise valid conviction.
In State v. Gambrell, 814 P.2d 1136 (Utah App. 1991), the
defendant claimed that the County Attorney who prosecuted him never
filed a bond as required by statute, and that he was thus without
authority to initiate the charges, invalidating the trial court's
jurisdiction to hear the case.
The Utah Court of Appeals
disagreed, upholding defendant's conviction, stating:
"Under the de facto doctrine the acts of one
who assumes official authority and exercises
duties under color of a valid appointment or
election are valid where the community
acquiesces to his authority. The mere failure
to comply with a technical requirement does
not void the official's actions as to third
parties and the public. The acts are valid if
in the interests of justice.n
Id. at 1139 (citations omitted) •ftCCCtiTfl.State v. Sawyers, 819
P.2d 806, 808 (Utah App. 1991).
A city attorney prosecuting pursuant to section 10-3-928 would
have been acting Mas one who assumes official authority and
exercises duties under color of a valid appointment where the
community acquiesces to his authority.* Ibid.
Further, in the
absence of section 10-3-928, the city attorneys could have been

Opinion No. 92 - 16
Page 6
deputized by county attorneys to try cases in the name of the State
of Utah. Hence, the fact of not having been appointed by a county
prosecutor to try these cases can be viewed as a "mere technical
requirement which does not void the official's actions as to third
parties and the public.11 I M £ .
Third, the convictions obtained by the city attorneys are
clearly "in the interests of justice." We believe that Gambrell is
controlling in this instance, and that convictions obtained by city
attorneys while prosecuting in the name of the State of Utah would,
if otherwise valid, not be invalid due to having been obtained by
a city attorney.
Finally, caBe law from many other jurisdictions supports the
proposition that convictions are valid even though obtained by
prosecutors who may have had defective appointments.
In People v. Kemplev, 271 P. 478 (Cal* 1928), the court held
that special counsel for the state who assumed and exercised duties
of public officer under authorized appointment was an officer de
facto though not taking oath of office.
In People v. Montoya, 616 P.2d 156 (Colo. App. 1980), the
defendant contended that his conviction was void because the case
was prosecuted by deputies of the Attorney General's Office whose
appointments as special prosecutors for the District Attorney were
invalid, and therefore the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The
court held, however, that "even if ineligible as special
prosecutors, the members of the Attorney General's office acted as
de facto officers whose authority to prosecute [the defendant] may
not now be challenged*w l&. at 162. (citing Glavino v. People. 224
P. 225 (Colo. 1924).
In Stat;e v. Jaramlllo, 749 P.2d 1 (Idaho App. 1987), the
defendant challenged the validity of the appointment of the deputy
prosecuting attorney. The court held that under the authority of
Gasper v. District Court. 264 P.2d 679 (Idaho 1953) [which held,
inter alia, that where a duty or power is conferred by law on a
prosecuting attorney in this state, the same duty or power is
conferred upon his deputies) , the prosecutor was, at the time
relevant to this case, at least a de facto deputy prosecuting
attorney. In essence, the court said that if an appointment of the
deputy prosecuting attorney was not filed, he was at least a de
facto deputy prosecuting attorney.
In Gragg v. State. 201 N,W. 338 (Neb. 1924), a county attorney
appointed a private attorney to undertake a prosecution, but the
assistant did not file a bond or take the official oath. The court
affirmed the conviction, stating that the assistant "held himself
out as county attorney and performed the duties pertaining to this
office and was recognized by the public as county attorney, so that
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he was county attorney de facto.

M

Jjfl- at 340.

In Pamapet v. 9tate, 182 N,W.2d 459 (Misc. 1971), a district
attorney elected in one county served two counties. Though his
acts were arguably illegal as to the second county, the court held
that he was, at the very least, an officer de facto, and even if
his acts were illegal as to the second county's electors, such acts
were still valid*
Conclusion
That portion of Utah Code Ann. S 10-3-928 which purports to
empower city attorneys, who are not elected prosecutors, to
prosecute state criminal actions, and to do so without being
responsible to any elected prosecutor concerning such state
criminal actions, violates the Utah Constitution.
Notwithstanding the constitutional deficiency of the statute,
criminal convictions which have been obtained by city prosecutors
pursuant to section 10-3-928 are nevertheless valid.
Very truly yourB,

MICHAEL D. WIMS
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Enforcement Division

CREIGHTON C. HORTON II
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Enforcement Division

